Posts Tagged ‘ Potential Problem Analysis

Mechanical Failure Avoidance by Charles Witherell

Mechanical Failure Avoidance by Charles WitherellBook Review: Mechanical Failure Avoidance: Strategies and Techniques by Charles E. Witherell

This 1994 book was on the SMRP recommended reading list. Various tools and techniques are described very briefly along with the application, but there are no details offered on how to perform any of the analyses. The book would be of most value to an operations manager or executive who wants to understand the risks involved in their plant and equipment.

Neither technical nor management aspects of risk avoidance are discussed in much detail. The key message is that the complexity of technical problems coupled with a legal climate of strict liability for manufacturers means that failure avoidance needs to be a top management priority.

Key Concepts

  • Failure avoidance means forestalling the inevitable. Probability of failure within a specific time period and under specific conditions can be lowered, but never eliminated. [Although it's not what the author intended, we have to be careful with this message. Some get discouraged, throw up their hands here and say "it's hopeless."]
  • Modern failure avoidance adds significantly to the costs of goods and services we buy. [This is a fact, but reasonable people can debate whether the costss are "worth it."]
  • Failure investigation is not a linear process. Some charts show neat sequential steps, but really the investigation moves back and forth through these phases.
  • The size of a failure is determined primarily by the amount of energy or material out of control. Root causes are the same as sub-catastrophic events.
  • Sensitivity analysis is the study of subtle changes in problem parameters and their effect on the outcome. [The process is described conceptually in the book, but there are no details on how to do it.]
  • Hazards analysis describes a variety of analyses that attempt to anticipate potential ways of failing. One way of approaching it is a tree format with hazardous elements listed at level 1, triggering events at level 2, and corrective measures at level 3. Another method is to create a matrix with headings: condition, cause, consequences, category, and correction. [Kepner-Tregoe Potential Problem Analysis would quality as a kind of hazards analysis.]
  • Fault-Tree Analysis (FTA) is “a deductive logic model that depicts, in graphic format, conditions and combinations of conditions that can produce the fault or failure under consideration.”
  • Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is often used with FTA, but in spreadsheet format with the bill of materials as a starting point. The emphasis is on how each component can contribute to failure. FTA offers improved “perspective” and is usually used first.
  • High strength-to-weight materials used in applications with high operating stress dramatically diminish critical flaw size. The reduction in critical flaw size may even be reduced below the range of detectability resulting in expected brittle fractures.
  • There are four options for handling business risks: elimination, retention, transfer, and reduction. Elimination means discontinuing operations, removing people, or removing equipment. Retention means acceptance of the risk. Transfer refers to insurance, warranty, or other contractual agreement. [Reduction of risk is not elaborated upon in any way except to note that it can be the most cost-effective option. If so, then couldn't the subject have been given at least an extra couple of paragraphs?]

Useful Features

  • Decision model for implementing failure avoidance stratgies (p. 76)
  • Failure mechanisms for metals and alloys (p. 88)
  • Product characteristics and manufacturer conduct that can incur liability (p. 218)
  • Management implementation steps in organizing a failure avoidance program (p. 249)

Table of Contents

Chapter 1. Failure: Misfortune or Avoidable Event?

Chapter 2. Analyzing Failures

Chapter 3. Strategies That Work

Chapter 4. Failure Avoidance in Day-to-Day Practice

How to Evaluate and Approve Improvised Tools and Devices

Dangerous modification of channel locksWhen you have a “get ‘r’ done” culture of production and unplanned maintenance, frequent use of improvised tools emerges. Who can blame operators and maintenance personnel with a job to do and a finite time to do it in? In many ways improvising tools represents the kind of attempt at innovation, creativity, and entrepreneurship that should be lauded.

And yet… Who is liable if the tool breaks—dropping a load—or fractures—sending chips flying outward? Generally, the company will be liable and the argument can be made that they are responsible for ensuring that the correct tools are available for the job.

And how can quality be assured? Did the modified channel locks (above) give you shivers? Are you certain that no such tool exists in a toolbox at your location?

There is an extensive improv culture on the web that glorifies the modified tool as embodied creativity. A little time spent Googling “modified tools” would yield plenty to make an engineer shudder.

And yet, on rare occasions a custom tool is justified. Most of the equipment in existence has not been designed for maintainability. At some point you may be called upon to stamp or approve a tool for which you can’t find an alternative.

Here is a proposal for a process for approving improvised tools and devices.

Step 1. Problem Formulation

Document each of the following steps:

  • Ask what is the problem addressed by this device? What was the operator or mechanic attempting to do? What job were they trying to get done? Describe the problem in terms as simple and general as possible.
  • Search for a standard/commercially-available solution. Look through catalogs for something to solve your problem. Search online. Contact people who do similar work or handle similar equipment. Don’t be ashamed to ask for help: someone’s safety depends upon it.
  • Explore alternative solutions. If obvious commercial solutions do not exist, brainstorm different ways to get the job done. Even if you come up with ideas that are inferior to the improvised tool on your desk, document the idea and why it is not suitable.

2. Improvised Device Certification

If the solution is not forthcoming in the problem definition stage, we are forced to look hard at approving the device that has been made. If the tool is robust and generally a candidate for approval (unlike the modified channel locks above), then consider the following measures to maximize safety:

  • Perform an FMEA or Kepner-Tregoe Potential Problem Analysis. Document our work in detail for later review. Potential problems should include failure of each component in normal service as well as failure of components under severe service or shock loads. Consider how the tool might be misused and preventive steps to mitigate risk.
  • Perform a stress analysis for normal use. Ensure that a robust safety factor (5 or more) is present for the load. If the geometry is complex and finite element analysis is not available, then inspect the part carefully for cracks and plastic deformation. Test the material to ensure you know the yield strength and tensile strength in cases of uncertain material.
  • Review the FMEA/PPA and stress analysis with someone who has first-hand experience with use of the device. While a mechanic or operator will not be able to double-check your calculations,  they might be able to look at the free body diagram and point out forces or boundary conditions you missed.

General Questions for Impovised Devices

These questions don’t have right-or-wrong answers, but they generally have impacts upon the analysis that need to be considered.

  1. Have the modifications changed the material properties of the original tool? Was heat involved in the modification process? Is the tool used to apply significant forces?
  2. Was the shape of the tool changed? Did significant plastic deformation occur in the modification process? (Consider work hardening and the amount of force applied in the tool use process.) Did grinding, cutting, or other material removal occur in the modification process? (Were any sharp edges created?) Are there any attachments welded or fastened on? (Was the attachment for the purpose of gaining extra leverage?)
  3. Is the force vector on the tool consistent with the design intention? (Consider bending , tension, compression, torsion, and shear forces.)
  4. Can use of the tool be avoided with more disassembly? (Does the tool enable a shortcut?) What would it take to do the job with only commercially available tools?

If safety factors are sufficient to ensure safety under normal conditions, abuse/misuse has been considered, and an FMEA/PPA has been completed and reviewed with mechanics or operators, then just about everything possible has been done to responsibly put the tool back on the floor.